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CFSP Progress or Decline after Lisbon?

Innovative Provisions Meet Limited External Pressures

Nadia KLEIN & Wolfgang WESSELS*

In 2009, the Lisbon Treaty introduced major institutional innovations in the field of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including a High Representative with three hats, a European External Action Service (EEAS), a permanent chair of the European Council and – for the first time in EU integration – a form of carefully formulated flexible integration in military matters, namely the Permanent Structured Cooperation. Yet, compared to other policy fields equally characterized by severe concerns regarding the safeguarding of national sovereignty rights (Economic and Monetary Union (EMU); Area for Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ)), the CFSP is much less integrated and the institutional and procedural opportunities as designed by the Lisbon Treaty are only used to a limited extent. Put in a long-term perspective, this article argues that these differences can only be explained when taking into account not only the level of supranationalization (internal factor), but also the structure of the international system and the interests of major powers (external factor). We explore the working thesis that the limited problem-solving pressure and the persisting European reliance on the United States in foreign and security matters has slowed down integration efforts in the field of CFSP. Given the weak performance of the CFSP post-Lisbon in the context of an emerging multipolar world order, we identify only incremental deepening and an inclination towards low level activities. However, the fuller use of the legal innovations of the CFSP might be triggered in the future by systemic shifts such as an accelerated shift of the strategic focus of the US away from Europe and towards Asia. In turn, future external shocks would increase the pressure on EU states to cooperate and to pool their foreign policy resources in the Union's framework more effectively.

1 INTRODUCTION

When the Lisbon Treaty entered into force in 2009, the European Union acquired a whole new set of foreign policy institutions and instruments meant to boost the Union's performance as an international actor. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy with three hats,¹ the creation of a

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¹ In the literature, the High Representative is most often described as being 'double-hatted', referring to the post's double institutional affiliation with the Council and the Commission structures. However, given the fact that the Lisbon Treaty foresees three major institutional roles for the post – conducting the CFSP (Art. 18(2) TEU), presiding over the Foreign Affairs Council (Art. 18(3)), and being one of the Vice-Presidents of the European Commission (Art. 18(4)) – we speak of three hats.

European External Action Service (EEAS) and the nomination of a permanent President of the European Council represent innovative changes of the institutional architecture. In addition, the Lisbon Treaty introduced for the first time the carefully formulated opportunity of flexible integration in the field of security policy, allowing a group of willing and capable EU Member States to form a ‘Permanent Structured Cooperation’. Before and after Lisbon, much political and scholarly attention has been paid to the analysis of these new provisions of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), assessing their potential and their actual implementation.² Overall, the current debate about the development, successes and failures of the CFSP post-Lisbon concentrates mainly on institutional reforms and individual performances of the office holders, namely Catherine Ashton and Herman Van Rompuy. Some authors have also discussed the decisive impact of national interests of (big) EU Member States – varying across issue and geographic areas – on the implementation of the CFSP.³

This article aims at broadening the perspective by relating the development of the European foreign and security policy to the changing structure of the international system over the past twenty years. We argue that this structural approach⁴ allows identifying continuities and discontinuities beyond the daily CFSP business. Most importantly, it reveals how (geo)political dynamics shape the national interests of ‘great’ EU powers – which in turn condition the set-up and the actual use of CFSP provisions. Thus, we conceptualize the opportunity structure of the international system as a – often neglected – central factor, which explains the inclination of Member States to expand or limit the scope of action for any given CFSP framework.

The following puzzle serves as a starting point for our analysis: why is the CFSP so much less supranationalized compared to other EU policy fields, which

² See R. Balfour, A. Bailes & M. Kenna, *The European External Action Service at Work. How to Improve EU Foreign Policy.*, EPC Issue Paper No. 67 (Brussels 2012); J. Howorth, *The ‘New Faces’ of Lisbon: Assessing the Performance of Catherine Ashton and Herman van Rompuy on the Global Stage*, 16 *European For. Affairs Rev.* 3, 303–323 (2011); N. Helwig, P. Ivan & H. Kostanyan, *The New EU Foreign Policy Architecture. Reviewing the First Two Years of the EEAS*, Centre for European Policy Studies (Brussels 2013); Centre for European Policy Studies, Royal Institute for International Relations EGDMONT & European Policy Centre, *The Treaty of Lisbon: Implementing the Institutional Innovations. Joint Study* (Brussels 2007); Centre for European Policy Studies, Royal Institute for International Relations EGDMONT & European Policy Centre, *The Treaty of Lisbon: A Second Look at the Institutional Innovations. Joint Study* (Brussels 2010).

³ See C. Grant, *Is Europe Doomed to Fail as a Power?* Centre for European Reform (London 2009); S. Lehne, *The Big Three in EU Foreign Policy*, The Carnegie Papers (Washington DC 2012), www.carnegieendowment.org; N. Helwig, *EU Foreign Policy and the High Representative’s Capability-Expectations Gap: A Question of Political Will*, 18 *European For. Affairs Rev.* 2, 235–254 (2013).

⁴ See C. Masala, *Neorealismus und Internationale Politik im 21. Jahrhundert*, 16 *Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft* 87–110 (2006); K. Waltz, *The Emerging Structure of International Politics*, 18 *Int’l Sec.* 44–79 (1993); K. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York 1979).

are equally characterized by sovereignty concerns but much deeper integrated, such as the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) or the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) with key items of justice and home affairs (see below)? What does it tell us about the overall development of the CFSP? The analysis will be guided by the following working thesis: to date, European foreign and security policy has been characterized by a comparatively limited problem-solving pressure, which slowed down integration efforts in this field, regardless of the CFSP innovations of the Lisbon Treaty.

This means that in order to answer the question posed in the title – progress or decline of the CFSP after Lisbon? – an *internal* perspective on the new institutions, procedures and instruments has to be combined with an *external* perspective on the (current) international environment. We argue that the transition from the unipolar moment and US supremacy after the end of the Cold War⁵ to the currently emerging multipolar world order has to be taken into account when assessing the actual potential of CFSP provisions. For example, it will be explored in how far the proclamation of ‘America’s Pacific Century’ by the Obama administration⁶ can be expected to influence the overall development of EU foreign policy. In this context, two contrasting scenarios can be developed: on the one hand, a reduced US–American interest in Europe and its foreign policy might force the EU to step up its own resources and strategic vision as an international actor. In this case, the Lisbon provisions might support significant CFSP progress, generally understood as the capability to pursue EU foreign policy interests efficiently and effectively. On the other hand, though, it might turn out that with regard to ‘high politics’,⁷ Europe won’t be able to act on its own without US–American backing. The crisis in Libya in 2011 and the related (military) US involvement might serve as an illustrative example in this regard. In the latter case, Lisbon would mark the beginning of the decline of the CFSP, because it would demonstrate that even with a set of innovative institutional provisions, the EU is ‘still punching below its weight’.⁸ This scenario would imply that institutions do not matter – or at least not as much as some constitutional architects expect.

We argue that relevant EU governments – namely the ‘Big Three’ France, Germany and the United Kingdom – perceive, rightly or wrongly, the need to

⁵ See S. Fröhlich, *The New Geopolitics of Transatlantic Relations. Coordinated Responses to Common Dangers* 6 (Woodrow Wilson Center Press 2012).

⁶ H. Clinton, *America’s Pacific Century*, Foreign Policy (2011), www.foreignpolicy.com (accessed 19 Nov. 2012).

⁷ S. Hoffmann, *Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe*, 95 *Daedalus* 862–915 (1966).

⁸ D.C. Thomas, *Still Punching below Its Weight? Coherence and Effectiveness in European Union Foreign Policy?* 50 *J. Com. Mkt. Stud.* 457–474 (2012).

work together via EU institutions as being limited. From their perspective, the list of issues of imminent vital importance for the defence of their states is small and can still be better dealt with for example in the NATO framework or informal coalitions under US leadership. Crucially, the Big Three can forum-shop,⁹ and apparently, alternative forums and channels are often more useful to them. Consequently, the costs for not having a full-fledged CFSP are low.

In contrast, the majority of EU Member States estimated the costs of non-integration in other policy fields as significantly higher. An outstanding example is the creation of the single European currency and of the supranational European Central Bank, embedded in the framework of the EMU.¹⁰ Another example are the EU competences in the field of justice and home affairs, established by Maastricht as an intergovernmental ‘third pillar’ of the EU, and since the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999) assembled under the term ‘AFSJ’. In the past decade, a significant leap in terms of supranationalization could be observed for this policy field – with the abolishment of the pillar structure, the Lisbon Treaty even introduced the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the EU for the AFSJ.¹¹

Arguably, many different factors account for the specific path of integration of the EMU and the AFSJ, respectively. From the longer-term perspective of this article, though, we think that it is fruitful to highlight their similar integration dynamic over time – which sharply differentiates them from the CFSP. Given the fact that the CFSP, the EMU and the AFSJ all touch upon core issues of national sovereignty, and that all three policy areas involve different national interests and heritages, we wonder why there is a substantial upgrading in terms of the level of integration in two areas (EMU and AFSJ) and not in the other (CFSP)? Notwithstanding the current problems of and in the eurozone,¹² the different development of these three policy fields since the summit held in The Hague 1969 over the past decades is striking and cannot be explained by internal factors only.

⁹ See S. Lehne, *The Big Three in EU Foreign Policy*, The Carnegie Papers 1 (Washington DC, July 2012), www.carnegieendowment.org.

¹⁰ See K. Dyson & L. Quaglia, *European Economic Governance and Policies* (Oxford U. Press 2010); J.-C. Piris, *The Lisbon Treaty. A Legal and Political Analysis* 301–307 (Cambridge U. Press 2010).

¹¹ Piris, *supra* n. 10, at 167–203; J. Monar, *Justice and Home Affairs: The Treaty of Maastricht as a Decisive Intergovernmental Gate Opener*, 34 J. European Pub. Policy, Special Issue 7, 717–734 (2012); F. Trauner & H. Carrapico, *The External Dimension of EU Justice and Home Affairs after the Lisbon Treaty: Analyzing the Dynamics of Expansion and Diversification*, 17 European For. Affairs Rev., Special Issue 5, 165–182 (2012); W. Knelangen, *Das Politikfeld innere Sicherheit im Integrationsprozess. Die Entstehung einer europäischen Politik der inneren Sicherheit* (Leske und Budrich Verlag 2001).

¹² See T. Kunstein & W. Wessels, *What We Hope, What We Fear, What We Expect: Possible Scenarios for the Future of the Eurozone*, 11 European View 5–14 (2012). While the ongoing eurocrisis might lead to stagnation or even a backlash in terms of the level of integration of the EMU and the EU as a whole in the future, it does not affect the puzzle of up to now highly diverging levels of integration within the CFSP and the EMU, which serves as a point of departure for this article.

Against this background, we aim at shedding light at both internal and external factors of CFSP (non)integration over time.

The article starts with a discussion of central concepts, namely a process-oriented definition of the traditional dichotomy of supranational and intergovernmental methods in EU integration, as well as the conditioning impact of the structure of the international system. It then provides a short overview over the development of EU foreign and security policy initiatives, with a particular focus on the period since the establishment of the CFSP in 1993 with the Maastricht Treaty. In this context, special attention will be paid to the impact of power dynamics resulting from the changing polarity structure during the two past decades. In the main part of the article, the Lisbon innovations in the field of CFSP will be analysed in view of continuities and discontinuities from a mid- to long-term perspective. We will illustrate our argument by referring to recent cases of CFSP (in)action. The article concludes by indicating possible scenarios of CFSP development after Lisbon in a multipolar world order.

2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: THE SUPRANATIONAL - INTERGOVERNMENTAL DICHOTOMY AND THE QUESTION OF POLARITY

Traditionally, the conceptual debate in the field of EU integration studies has been characterized by the dichotomy between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism, circumscribing integration approaches with more (supranational) or less (intergovernmental) loss of sovereignty from the perspective of EU¹³ Member States.¹⁴ In the following, 'supranationalization' is understood as a process, which can be captured on the basis of three selected indicators: (1) a move of competences from the Member State to the EU level; (2) an increase of qualified majority voting in the Council, veto powers for the EP and (some) competences for the Court of Justice (supranational mode of decision-making), and (3) an increase regarding institutionalized forms of joint representation of the EU vis-à-vis external actors. In turn, 'intergovernmentalization' is understood as the process of safeguarding or re-establishing the dominant role of EU Member States to the detriment of supranational institutions such as the European Commission and the European Parliament: (1) hardly any move of competences from the Member State to the EU level; (2) maintaining unanimity as the

¹³ The European Union (EU) was created in 1993 by the Treaty of Maastricht. For the sake of readability, this article refers to 'EU Member States' whenever the time period after Maastricht is included, and to 'EC Member States' whenever the time period after Maastricht is excluded.

¹⁴ For a critical assessment of the explanatory power of the supranational-intergovernmental dichotomy see A.P. Branch & J.C. Ohrgaard, *Trapped in the Supranational-Intergovernmental Dichotomy: A Response to Stone Sweet and Sandholtz*, 6 J. European Pub. Policy 123–143 (1999).

dominant role of decision-making (intergovernmental mode of decision-making) and no or only weak roles for the supranational institutions of the EU, and (3) a strengthening of Member State-based forms of representation of the EU vis-à-vis external actors. In many cases, as exemplified by the EMU and the AFSJ, the overall development in EU integration runs from a (more) intergovernmental set-up to more supranationalized forms of policy-making within the EU framework.

For the purpose of this article, this process-oriented definition of the classical supranational-intergovernmental dichotomy has two advantages: first, it allows analysing and assessing fine-grained developments after Lisbon in a policy field, the CFSP, which is still largely intergovernmental, but which is increasingly incorporating supranational elements such as the permanent chair of the Foreign Affairs Council by the High Representative and a strengthened though still low influence of the European Parliament. We argue that the specific integration dynamics within CFSP can be captured best by a process-oriented definition, which allows the identification of 'more' and 'less' – and not only 'many' and 'few' – supranational and intergovernmental elements, respectively. Second, as this article aims at identifying and explaining a long-term development *trend* – progress or decline of the CFSP – in opposition to a short-term status quo analysis, a process-oriented definition suits our diachronic approach.

Notwithstanding our focus on the long-term CFSP development, we also value the explanatory power of synchronic comparisons regarding the level of integration of different EU policy fields at a certain moment in time. Thus, while the development of a general 'EU integration index' is beyond the scope of this article, we tentatively qualify the level of integration within the CFSP after Lisbon on the basis of the three indicators as outlined above: (1) the division of competences between the EU level and the Member State level; (2) the mode of decision-making, ranging from unanimity to qualified majority voting, and (3) forms of joint representation of the EU vis-à-vis external actors. The more competences have been transferred to the EU level, the more decisions are taken on the basis of qualified majority, and the more supranational EU institutions are given the power to initiate, implement and represent EU policies vis-à-vis external actors, the higher is the level of integration in the policy field under scrutiny. In a similar vein, Furness has argued that the autonomy of CFSP actors such as the new EEAS can serve as a general indicator for the EU's international actorness, taking into account that '[t]he Service's capacity for independent decision-making and implementation is an indicator of the European commitment [...] to strengthen the supra-national aspect of the EU's external relations, and to invest in 'more EU'

in a traditionally sovereign state-dominated domain'.¹⁵ From this perspective, supranationalization dynamics – as limited as they might be in the CFSP – would account for the political will of EU Member States to strengthen and to actually use the institutional basis of a genuine European foreign and security policy. In other words, supranationalization dynamics could be interpreted as 'progress' of the CFSP as a whole.

Yet, such an interpretation might be biased because it neglects the relevance of external factors, namely the structure of the international system and related power dynamics. Thus, a recent contribution on the relationship between coherence and effectiveness in EU foreign policy convincingly demonstrated that even a coherent EU approach, bringing together both policy determinacy and political cohesion among the EU Member States and the EU institutions, might be not sufficient to influence policy-making at the international level.¹⁶ While not discussing in detail the impact of different structures of the international system, Thomas highlights the fact that the current 'multi-centric world order where many others do not share the EU's collective preferences and are ready to deploy vast resources in pursuit of their goals'¹⁷ may well be a decisive factor for the success or failure of CFSP initiatives¹⁸ and also for the CFSP as a whole. Thereby, this study brings in classical questions of neo-realist thinking, namely the international distribution of power and the resulting structure of the international system with its opportunities and constraints.

Drawing on earlier work by Klein et al,¹⁹ we define three major periods characterized by different polarity structures to which the European integration process has been exposed: (1) the post-1945 period and the following period of the Cold War (bipolarity), (2) the post-1989 period (unipolarity with the United States of America as sole superpower) and (3) the post-2001 period (emerging multipolarity). While acknowledging the methodological challenges regarding the measurement of the power of nation states²⁰ and the related periodization of

¹⁵ M. Furness, *Who Controls the European External Action Service? Agent Autonomy in EU External Policy*, 18 *European For. Affairs Rev.* 1, 103–125 at 124 (2013).

¹⁶ See Thomas, *supra* n. 8, at 459.

¹⁷ See Thomas, *supra* n. 8, at 472.

¹⁸ The case study explored by Thomas is the EU's response to the United States' campaign for the 'non-surrender agreements' of the International Criminal Court – a coherent though largely unsuccessful EU initiative.

¹⁹ See N. Klein, W. Reiners, Z. Chen, J. Jian & I. Slosarcik, *Diplomatic Strategies of Major Powers: Competing Patterns of International Relations? The Cases of the United States of America, China and the European Union*, MERCURY E-paper 2, 4–5 (2010), http://www.europa.ed.ac.uk/global_europa/external_relations/mercury/publications (accessed 15 Apr. 2013).

²⁰ Kenneth Waltz defined six – rather broad – categories of power, namely the size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence. See Waltz, *supra* n. 4, at 131.

polarity structures, the proposed model reflects the results of recent studies on global trends. In particular, the year 2001 can be interpreted as the beginning of a period of emerging multipolarity for various reasons: for example, in 2001, a Goldman Sachs report²¹ coined the term ‘BRIC’ to designate four emerging economic powers – Brazil, Russia, India and China – expected to change the ‘relative positions of key countries in the world economy’.²² Moreover, China’s aspirations as a rising power – by no means restricted to the economic sphere – were further enhanced by the creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2001 following a Chinese initiative.²³ In 2008, the often-cited report ‘Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World’ confirmed the long-term trends as predicted at the beginning of the decade and stated that ‘[a] global multipolar system is emerging with the rise of China, India, and others’ and ‘[t]he United States will remain the single most powerful country but will be less dominant’.²⁴

Against this background and for the purpose of this article, the definition of ‘progress’ of the CFSP is two-fold: the intensive use of an increasing level of supranationalization (internal factor) due to increasing pressures from current dynamics of the international system, namely the conditioning preferences of major powers (external factor). In turn, ‘decline’ of the CFSP is defined by a stagnation or even reduction of the use of relevant provisions caused by a withdrawal of Member State resources from the European level (internal factor) and an adverse international environment, which leaves little room for manoeuvre for European foreign and security policy (external factor).

3 FROM THE EUROPEAN POLITICAL COMMUNITY VIA THE HAGUE SUMMIT 1969 TO LISBON 2009

Historically, the political dispute about the very nature of the European unification process can be dated back to the failure of the European Political Community in 1954 and the rejection of the French Fouchet Plans of 1961/1962. While the EPC aimed at uniting the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the then planned European Defence Community with an emphasis on supranational elements, the Fouchet Plans foresaw a political union with strong competences for the Member State level and only limited competences for supranational institutions. The failure of these early initiatives to intensify the political

²¹ See J. O’Neill, *Building Better Global Economic BRICs*, Global Economics Paper 66 (2001), <http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/archive/archive-pdfs/build-better-brics.pdf> (12 Apr. 2013).

²² See O’Neill, *supra* n. 21, at 6.

²³ See Klein et al., *supra* n. 19, at 23.

²⁴ National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World*, Doc. NIC 2008-003 iv (Washington DC 2008), <http://www.acus.org/publication/global-trends-2025-transformed-world> (accessed 15 Apr. 2013).

cooperation in Europe in the field of foreign and security policy can be partly explained by the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949 and the overall reliance of the ECSC Member States on the military superpower of the United States of America during the bipolar period of the Cold War. We argue that the majority of ECSC Member States – and from 1958 onwards the Member States of the European Economic Community (EEC) – didn't feel the urgent need to invest their foreign policy resources in the build-up of a European framework.

In 1969, during the summit in The Hague, the heads of states and governments envisaged again a move towards a more political community, including the build-up of some kind of soft cooperation in the framework of their foreign policies. Thus, they established the procedure of the European Political Cooperation (EPC), which included the obligation to consult the other EEC partners with regard to all foreign policy questions.²⁵ This informal intergovernmental consultation mechanism was codified only in 1987 with the Single European Act. With the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, the EPC was transformed into the CFSP, the second pillar of the newly created European Union. While the acquirement of a sound legal basis – though not yet including a legal personality – can be qualified as a significant leap on the integration ladder for the CFSP, the overall level of integration of the CFSP remained low: EU institutions had hardly any competencies, there was no jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the EU, decisions were taken on the basis of consensus only, and the external representation was carried out by the six-month rotating EU presidency.

With the end of the Cold War, the polarity structure of the international system had changed dramatically from bipolarity to unipolarity with the United States as sole remaining superpower. Europe was no longer divided, and the enlargement of the then European Community to Eastern Europe was envisaged. Yet, there was only limited change in terms of the (West) European impetus to establish an autonomous European foreign and security policy beyond enlargement policy, and, later on, a European Neighbourhood Policy.²⁶ In fact, there was little external pressure to do so, especially with the US and NATO

²⁵ See E. Regelsberger, P. De Schoutheete de Tervarent & W. Wessels, *Foreign Policy of the European Union: From EPC to CFSP and Beyond* (Lynne Rienner 1997); R.H. Ginsberg, *Foreign Policy Actions of the European Community: The Politics of Scale* (Lynne Rienner 1989); D. Allen, R. Rummel & W. Wessels, *European Political Cooperation: Towards a Foreign Policy for Western Europe* (Butterworth Scientific 1982).

²⁶ In May 2004, the accession of ten new member states marks the largest single enlargement of the EU. In the same month, the European Neighbourhood Policy was created in order to provide a comprehensive framework for the cooperation with the then new neighbouring states of the Union. See European Commission, *Communication from the Commission. European Neighbourhood Policy. Strategy Paper*, Doc. COM(2004) 373 final (Brussels, 12 May 2004).

becoming strongly engaged in the conflicts breaking up in the Western Balkans from 1991 onwards.²⁷ In contrast, especially the UK – the closest US ally and, together with France, the leading EU Member State in terms of diplomatic and military resources – was concerned not to put off the US by any foreign policy initiative, which could be perceived as defecting from the transatlantic alliance. After all, the dynamics regarding NATO's enlargement to the East – on the side of old NATO Member States and on the side of aspirant Member States from the former Soviet bloc – forcefully underlined the unbroken vitality and attractiveness of the alliance at that time.

At the end of the 1990s, when the lack of EU civil-military crisis management capabilities to deal with the conflicts in the European neighbourhood had caused major concerns on both sides of the Atlantic, major players had changed their mind. The US and the UK still favoured a strong Atlantic Alliance. However, in the meantime, they considered a – more or less autonomous – European security and defence initiative as the only means to unleash increased defence efforts by the EU Member States in order to keep NATO alive and kicking.²⁸ France, an outsider within NATO²⁹ and the strongest advocate of a forceful European foreign and security policy, seized the opportunity of the favourable international environment. The Franco-British summit in St. Malo in 1998³⁰ paved the way for the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in 1999 at the European Council meetings in Cologne and Helsinki. Legally, the ESDP was set up as an integral part of the CFSP.³¹ Various factors finally led to the long-debated first time creation of military structures within the EU, thereby significantly extending and upgrading the CFSP agenda. For the purpose of this article, the decisive impact of the external factor is noteworthy: after the end of bipolarity, international politics were characterized by the increased breakout of (civil) wars with potentially destabilizing effects at the regional or even international level.³² The Balkan wars represent a case in point. As

²⁷ See T. Gallagher, *The Balkans in the New Millenium: In the Shadow of War and Peace* (Routledge 2005).

²⁸ See J. Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union* 30 (Palgrave Macmillan 2007).

²⁹ In 1966, President Charles de Gaulle pulled France out of NATO's integrated military command in order to safeguard its national sovereignty. In 2009, under President Nicolas Sarkozy, France returned to NATO's military command.

³⁰ The Heads of State and Government of France and the United Kingdom, Joint Declaration issued at the British-French Summit, Saint-Malo, France, 3–4 Dec. 1998. Published by the EU Institute for Security Studies in February 2000. <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/French-British%20Summit%20Declaration,%20Saint-Malo,%201998%20-%20EN.pdf> (accessed 15 Apr. 2013).

³¹ In the Treaty on European Union (TEU) based on the Treaty of Nice (signed 2001, entered into force 2003), the provisions on the ESDP were laid down in Art. 17 within Title V 'Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy'.

³² Relevant data can be found in the SIPRI Yearbooks on *Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, the latest issue being published in 2012 by the Oxford University Press on behalf of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

a consequence, the US, the sole remaining superpower was increasingly interested in a more balanced burden-sharing with its European allies.³³ Arguably, without the changing preferences of the US and its impact namely on British preferences, the ESDP would not have taken shape.³⁴

Also in the year 1999, the Treaty of Amsterdam introduced the position of the High Representative for the CFSP.³⁵ The competencies of Javier Solana, the first incumbent, were essentially limited to the support of the EU Member State Presidency and the Council of the EU. Nevertheless, his inauguration marks a milestone in terms of the external representation of the CFSP: for ten years, until the Treaty of Lisbon upgraded this position and Catherine Ashton took over (see below), he became the 'face' of and acted as central contact person for all CFSP-related matters.³⁶ Many CFSP initiatives, and especially the implementation of the more than twenty civilian and military ESDP missions between 1999 and 2009³⁷ were closely linked to Solana's diplomatic skills, displayed in the Brussels arena and abroad.

4 THE CFSP PROVISIONS IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD: A FIRST REVIEW

When the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon upgraded the position of the High Representative and introduced other major institutional innovations in the CFSP the structure of the international system had changed again: from US-dominated unipolarity to a somewhat elusive emerging multipolarity. As outlined in the introduction, the rise of new powers, namely the BRICS³⁸ states, has induced a world-wide shift of attention and resources towards these powers. We argue that this ongoing development has two major consequences for the EU foreign and

³³ See D.S. Hamilton, *Das große Sowohl-Als-Auch: die Europapolitik unter Barack Obama*, 62 *Osteuropa: interdisziplinäre Monatszeitschrift zur Analyse von Politik, Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft, Kultur und Zeitgeschichte in Osteuropa, Ostmitteleuropa und Südosteuropa* 5–26 at 5 (2012).

³⁴ For an opposing view see Fröhlich, *supra* n. 5, at 6. He identifies Europe's 'discontent' and 'frustration' regarding the US dominance after the end of bipolarity as a driving force for the 'gradual development of the EU from an economic power to an influential [...] actor far beyond the continent of Europe'.

³⁵ For a comprehensive analysis of the post of the High Representative from its creation in 1999 until the upgrading by the Lisbon Treaty see *The High Representative for the EU Foreign and Security Policy – Review and Prospects* (G. Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet & C. Rügger eds., Nomos 2011).

³⁶ Until the Lisbon Treaty, the rotating EU presidency was also in charge of representing the EU externally in CFSP matters. However, the change of the EU presidency every six months accounted for the fact that (only) Solana became the face of the CFSP over time.

³⁷ See *European Security and Defence Policy. The first Ten Years (1999-2009)* (G. Grevi, D. Helly & D. Keohane eds., Paris, EU Institute for Security Studies 2009).

³⁸ In 2011, South Africa joined the former BRIC group, which now includes countries from four continents and calls itself 'BRICS'. See J.A. Smith, *BRIC Becomes BRICS: Changes to the Geopolitical Chessboard*, *Foreign Policy Journal*, 21 Jan. 2011, www.foreignpolicyjournal (accessed 10 Apr. 2013).

security policy: first, the loss of a perceived ‘protection automatism’ by the US, and second, an increasing competition or even confrontation with other international powers. The first point can be illustrated by referring to the US pivot to Asia, motivated first and foremost by concerns about terrorist bases on the territory of Afghanistan and Pakistan,³⁹ but also driven by concerns about the (military) rise of China.⁴⁰ At the practical level, this shift to Asia is documented by a – still very limited though – relocation of US military forces from Europe to the Asian region and by a change of US military doctrine, focusing more on maritime air operations as a response to possible threats in the China Sea.⁴¹ While some observers of the US policy towards Europe do not expect a fundamental turning away of the US from their long-term allies,⁴² the EU will nevertheless be unsettled by the fact that the US will gradually disengage from conflict management in the European neighbourhood.⁴³ However, as outlined below, even this shift of US priorities has not (yet) led to an upgrading of common efforts to date.

The second consequence – the competition with rising powers – has already materialized in the wider field of EU external action. For example, over the past years, EU development policy in Africa had to cope with China as an emerging donor in the international aid system. The EU approach, which is based on conditionality clauses and good governance promotion, differs significantly from the Chinese engagement ‘no strings attached’.⁴⁴ Basically, such a competition about influence and access in third countries is equally relevant for the CFSP: where conditionality loses its leverage effect,⁴⁵ CFSP sanctions can be expected to lose their threatening effect, too.

³⁹ See D. Hamilton & N. Foster, *The Obama Administration and Europe*, in *The Obama Moment. European and American Perspectives* 39–57, at 44–46 (A. de Vasconcelos & M. Zaborowski eds., Paris 2009).

⁴⁰ See A. Sakaki & A. Noguchi, *Die neue Asien-Strategie der USA: Japanische Reaktionen und Perspektiven* (Berlin, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik 2012); D. Fiott, *Improving CSDP Planning and Capability Development: Could there be a ‘Frontex Formula’?* 18 *European For. Affairs Rev.* 1, 47–62, at 62 (2013).

⁴¹ C. Major, *Mehr Europa in der Nato. Die Allianz wandelt sich - die Europäer können diese Wandlung steuern*, SWP-Aktuell 52, 2 (Berlin, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik 2012), http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/aktuell/2012A52_mjr.pdf (accessed 15 Apr. 2013).

⁴² See Hamilton, *supra* n. 33.

⁴³ See Lehne, *supra* n. 3, at 9.

⁴⁴ C. Hackenesch, *European Good Governance Policies Meet China in Africa: Insights from Angola and Ethiopia*, EDC2020 Working Paper 10, 7 (February 2011), <http://bonnsustainabilityportal.de/?p=12976> (accessed 12 Apr. 2013).

⁴⁵ *Nota bene*: As Hackenesch has stressed, there are various factors which currently limit the EU’s ability to influence governance reforms abroad. In her finely nuanced study on Angola and Ethiopia, she even concludes that ‘most of them [are] not directly related to Chinese engagement’. See Hackenesch, *supra* n. 44, at 36.

4.1 INSTITUTIONAL COMPLEXITY AFTER LISBON: CONTINUITIES AND DISCONTINUITIES

In the following section, the legal provisions of the CFSP after Lisbon will be briefly analysed in view of continuities and discontinuities compared to previous EU foreign policy settings. In particular, this section aims at identifying trends of supranationalization or intergovernmentalization (internal factor),⁴⁶ which will then be related to the current international environment (external factor).

The most visible change of the CFSP by the Lisbon Treaty is the new personnel. First, there is now a permanent President of the European Council, who 'shall, at his level and in that capacity, ensure the external representation of the Union on issues concerning its common foreign and security policy, without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy'.⁴⁷ This vague formulation in the treaty de facto requires from the President of the European Council and from the High Representative to define an ad hoc division of labour regarding the external representation in CFSP matters. In addition, based on functions allocated to the European Commission,⁴⁸ in many occasions, the High Representative and the President of the European Commission share the task of representing the Union externally, for example in meetings with world leaders, which can be a source of conflict.⁴⁹

Second, the post of the High Representative, now called 'High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy' has been significantly upgraded. The incumbent is also a Vice-President of the European Commission. On the basis of this double-hatting, ideally, the High Representative/Vice-President 'shall ensure the consistency of the Union's external action'.⁵⁰ Thus, on the one hand, the Lisbon Treaty has reduced the institutional complexity of the previous setting by fusing the post of the High Representative with the former Commissioner for External Relations. On the other hand, though, the Treaty added a new face to the external representation of the CFSP, namely the President of the European Council. Therefore, overall, there is a certain continuity

⁴⁶ See s. 2. Conceptual framework.

⁴⁷ Article 15(6) TEU.

⁴⁸ Article 17 (6) TEU.

⁴⁹ See W. Wessels, *The European Council* (Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming). An early example of conflict during the set-up of the European External Action Service was Barroso's controversial decision to nominate the EU official João Vale de Almeida as the next EU ambassador in Washington. See Charlemagne, *Catherine Ashton and her Barroso problem*, *The Economist*, 1 Feb. 2010, http://www.economist.com/blogs/charlemagne/2010/02/national_governments_let_rip_mr_barroso (accessed 19 Apr. 2013).

⁵⁰ Article 18(4) TEU.

regarding the structural complexity of CFSP external representation – even with the new personnel after Lisbon.⁵¹

In contrast, the new competence of the High Representative to chair the Foreign Affairs Council⁵² – her third hat – marks a rupture with previous CFSP conventions. The replacement of the six-month rotating EU Presidency should ideally lead to more continuity in CFSP. Within his five-year term, and based on his right of initiative (shared with the EU Member States),⁵³ the incumbent has now improved means to shape and implement a CFSP agenda based on long-term objectives of the Union.

The third new actor in town is the EEAS. Created by the Lisbon Treaty,⁵⁴ a Council Decision of July 2010 laid down details about the set-up and the functioning of the EEAS, defining it as a ‘functionally autonomous body of the Union under the authority of the High Representative’.⁵⁵ Its hybrid composition, bringing together EU officials from the General Secretariat of the Council and from the European Commission as well as diplomats from the EU Member States, gave new impetus to the old question in how far a genuine ‘esprit de corps’ in EU foreign policy could and should be developed.⁵⁶ In the context of this article, it is noteworthy that the regulations for the EEAS reflect traditional institutional turf battles between the supranational Community side on the one hand, and the intergovernmental Council side on the other hand. Thus, the European Commission has retained major external action portfolios, namely trade, development, humanitarian aid, enlargement and neighbourhood policy, and it also manages the external action operational budgets.⁵⁷ Accordingly, depending on the subject area, EU officials based in the EU delegations abroad receive their instructions both from the High Representative/Vice President and from relevant EU Commissioners. This means that the overall implementation of external action policies on the ground, including the CFSP, is not based on fully integrated structures. This bears the risk of inefficient and ineffective policy-making – and be it only because of a lack of mutual information.⁵⁸

⁵¹ See N. Klein & E. Regelsberger, *Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik*, in *Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 2010* at 243–250, 250 (W. Weidenfeld & W. Wessels eds., Nomos 2011).

⁵² Article 18(3) TEU.

⁵³ Article 30 TEU.

⁵⁴ Article 27(3) TEU.

⁵⁵ Council of the EU, *Council Decision of 26 July 2010 Establishing the Organisation and Functioning of the European External Action Service*, Doc. 2010/427/EU, O.J.E.U L201/30 (3 Aug. 2010).

⁵⁶ See J. Lieb & M. Kremer, *Der Aufbau des Europäischen Auswärtigen Dienstes: Stand und Perspektiven*, 33 *Integration* 195–208 (2010).

⁵⁷ See Helwig, Ivan & Kostanyan, *supra* n. 2, at 30–34.

⁵⁸ In her report of 2011, Ashton reminds relevant Commission services to ‘routinely [copy]’ their instructions to the responsible geographic desk in the EEAS. European External Action Service, *Report by the High Representative to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission 22nd December 2011*, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/images/top_stories/2011_eeas_report_cor.pdf (accessed 13 Apr. 2013).

In addition to the newly created or upgraded CFSP actors, the Lisbon Treaty has introduced a legal personality for the EU as a whole,⁵⁹ which includes the CFSP. However, the TEU has clearly formulated that the ‘common foreign and security policy is subject to specific rules and procedures’.⁶⁰ Overall, the CFSP is still characterized by a decisively intergovernmental approach: unanimity is the dominant mode of decision-making; the European Council and the Council of the EU play leading roles for the conceptualization and implementation of the CFSP; there is no jurisdiction for the Court of Justice of the EU.⁶¹ However, further dynamics of ‘Brusselization’⁶² can be identified, namely by the shift away from the rotating EU Presidency in CFSP matters. It is not only the High Representative who now chairs the Foreign Affairs Council (see above), but is also the Political and Security Committee, the ‘linchpin of CFSP’,⁶³ which is now chaired on a permanent basis by an EEAS official.⁶⁴

Likewise, a slight increase of supranationalization can be observed with regard to the European Parliament’s role in the CFSP. At first sight, the Lisbon Treaty did not transfer new competences to the Parliament; its competences are essentially limited to the rights of being consulted and of being informed by the High Representative.⁶⁵ However, when the External Action Service was set up in 2010, the Parliament forcefully underlined that it is also able to shape the foundations of CFSP policy-making by exerting pressure via its budgetary powers. Thus, ‘[b]y threatening to block under co-decision rules the decision on budget and staffing of the EEAS, the European Parliament succeeded to obtain a de facto co-decision power on the Council decision on the EEAS’.⁶⁶

4.2 WEAK PERFORMANCE IN THE REAL WORLD

Despite the institutional reforms of the Lisbon Treaty, the overall record of the CFSP since 2009/2010 is widely perceived as being rather weak.⁶⁷ We see three major reasons, which will be exemplified below: first, a preoccupation of the

⁵⁹ Article 47 TEU.

⁶⁰ Article 24 (1) TEU.

⁶¹ Article 275 TFEU.

⁶² D. Allen, *Who Speaks for Europe? The Search for an Effective and Coherent External Policy*, in *A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? Competing Visions of the CFSP* (J. Peterson & H. Sjørnsen eds., Routledge 1998).

⁶³ S. Duke, *The Linchpin COPS. Assessing the Workings and Institutional Relations of the Political and Security Committee*, Working Paper 2005/W/05 (Maastricht: European Institute of Public Administration 2005).

⁶⁴ N. Klein & E. Regelsberger, *Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik*, in *Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 2011*, 261–270, at 267 (W. Weidenfeld & W. Wessels eds., Nomos 2012).

⁶⁵ Article 36 TEU.

⁶⁶ See Helwig, Ivan & Kostanyan, *supra* n. 2, at 50.

⁶⁷ See Helwig, *supra* n. 3, at 236.

European Council with the European sovereign debt crisis, second a lack of agenda-shaping impetus by the High Representative and third, a reluctance of EU Member States to actually use the Lisbon provisions for (military) crisis management.

In the political system of the EU after Lisbon, the European Council represents *the* top-level institution to provide strategic guidance for all fields of EU policy.⁶⁸ Since the break out of the world-wide financial and economic crisis in 2007, it has been heavily occupied with the discussion of the causes and the creation of instruments to counter the destabilizing effects of the crisis. A case in point is the 2012 creation of the European Stability Mechanism, located in Luxembourg, which aims at supporting indebted members of the eurozone.⁶⁹ Given the European Council's work overload with the pressing need to respond to the ongoing crisis, other policy fields and namely CFSP issues have rarely figured on top of its agenda since 2007.⁷⁰

Second, until to date, Catherine Ashton has struggled to define and push for a long-term oriented CFSP agenda. Especially the first year after the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, she was preoccupied with setting up the External Action Service. However, even two years later, in December 2011, Ashton was heavily criticized for not identifying political priorities in her area of responsibility, and, on the practical level, for the ad hoc preparation of the sessions of the Foreign Affairs Council.⁷¹

A third reason for the overall weak CFSP performance since Lisbon can be found with regard to the area of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the former European Security and Defence Policy. In fact, the new term 'CSDP', stressing the cooperation at the EU level ('common') might be misleading. Given the low number of new civilian and military EU operations in the past years – only one new mission in 2010 and 2011, and, at the time of writing, four new missions in 2012 and 2013⁷² – the term 'CSDP fatigue'⁷³

⁶⁸ Article 22(1) and 26 TEU.

⁶⁹ For details see the homepage of the European Stability Mechanism: <http://www.esm.europa.eu/>.

⁷⁰ For a detailed analysis of the agenda of European Council in the past decade see Wessels, *supra* n. 49.

⁷¹ In a confidential letter from 8 Dec. 2011, the foreign ministers from twelve EU Member States, including France, Germany, Italy, Poland and Sweden, criticized Ashton's lack of leadership and initiative. See T. Vogel, *Ashton on Defensive over EU's Diplomatic Service*, European Voice, 5 Jan. 2012, <http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/ashton-on-defensive-over-eu-s-diplomatic-service/73094.aspx> (accessed 13 Apr. 2013).

⁷² These five new missions were EUTM Somalia (start in 2010), EUAVSEC South-Sudan (2012), EUCAP NESTOR (2012), EUCAP SAHEL Niger (2012) and EUTM Mali (2013). For details, see the overview on EU operations on the website of the Council, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ceas/security-defence/eu-operations?lang=en> (accessed 13 Apr. 2013).

⁷³ N. König, *Libya: A Wakeup Call for CSDP?* TEPSA Brief 1 (Brussels 2012), [www.tepsa.eu/download/TEPSA_brief_by_Nicole_Koenig_March_2012\(2\).pdf](http://www.tepsa.eu/download/TEPSA_brief_by_Nicole_Koenig_March_2012(2).pdf); see also Lehne, *supra* n. 3, at 20–23.

entered the debate. Especially the crisis in Libya in 2011, when the ‘CSDP went “missing in action”’,⁷⁴ can be seen as a test case for the EU Member States’ (un)willingness to act within the CFSP framework. While the EU decided in principle about a military operation called EUFOR Libya to support the delivery of humanitarian assistance, the required call by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs never came. In contrast, in March 2011, it was the Atlantic Alliance, which launched the NATO-operation ‘Unified Protector’.⁷⁵ Importantly, while the US supported the operation with specific military capacities, they made clear that they expected the European NATO Member States to take over the biggest share of the burden.⁷⁶ For some observers, the NATO operation in Libya therefore exemplifies (a) the current re-positioning of the US in a multipolar world, including a reduced (NATO) engagement in the wider European context, and (b) in turn, the increasing need for EU Member States to effectively pool and share their military capabilities, not least in view of the general cut of national defence budgets as a result of the international financial crisis.⁷⁷ As mentioned before, after long and controversial discussions, the Lisbon Treaty introduced the concept of the Permanent Structured Cooperation, which allowed for the first time flexible integration in the field of EU security policy. Article 42(6) TEU specifies that ‘[t]hose Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another [...] with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework’. Article 46 TEU provides further provisions, as well as a ‘Protocol on Permanent Structured Cooperation’ annexed to the Lisbon Treaty. However, to date, no Permanent Structured Cooperation has been established.

To conclude this section, we have to highlight the fact that our argument as sketched above needs further examination, namely on the basis of in-depth empirical studies that cut across policy fields. For example, in a 2013 contribution to this journal, Fiott compared recent developments in the FRONTEX framework with the – missing – developments in terms of capabilities and planning in the CSDP framework. When explaining the fundamentally different dynamics between the area of border protection and European defence – pragmatic supranationalization on the one hand and stalemate in the

⁷⁴ See König, *supra* n. 73, at 1.

⁷⁵ See G. Hauser, *Der Libyen-Einsatz der NATO und die militärischen Defizite der Allianz*, 5 *Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik* 229–241 (2012).

⁷⁶ See Hamilton, *supra* n. 33, at 20. European NATO Member States – with the exception of Germany – contributed over 95% of the resources of the operation.

⁷⁷ See Hamilton, *supra* n. 33, at 20–21; Hauser, *supra* n. 75, at 239; Major, *supra* n. 41.

intergovernmental set-up on the other hand – he identified six major factors. While five of them refer to internal EU processes and specific interests of selected EU Member States, he also stressed the relevance of an external factor, namely the role of the United States: ‘[...] the absence of the US from the EU’s border management policies implies that Europeans must find their own solutions, whereas in defence, the security umbrella afforded by the US through NATO [...] dampens the motivation for Europe to fully ‘go it alone’.⁷⁸ Similarly, it can be argued that the US has not been intrinsically involved with the establishment of economic governance structures in the EU – and that the Europeans had to find their own solutions such as the creation of the single currency.

6 CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK

This article aimed at assessing the long-term development of the European foreign and security policy, with a special emphasis on the role of the US and the structure of the international system. We argued that to date, the CFSP has been characterized by a limited problem-solving pressure, which slowed down integration efforts in this field. The analysis started with the puzzle that even after the institutional reforms provided by the Lisbon Treaty, the CFSP kept its fundamentally intergovernmental character – in contrast to other policy fields such as the EMU and the Area for Freedom, Security and Justice. Crucially, European policy-making and institution-building in the context of the CFSP, the EMU and the AFSJ, respectively, has always been characterized by strong concerns about EU Member State sovereignty. Yet, especially after Lisbon, the EMU and the AFSJ manifest a high level of (supranational) integration. In the case of the CFSP, only modest steps of supranationalization or ‘Brusselization’ can be identified. Most importantly, the chairing of the Foreign Affairs Council by the triple-hatted High Representative as well as the permanent chair of the Political and Security Committee by an official of the newly created External Action Service provide the opportunity for a more coherent and longer-term oriented EU foreign policy approach compared to the traditional set-up with the six-month rotating EU Presidency.

However, despite these institutional innovations after Lisbon, the overall record of the CFSP is widely perceived as being weak. As outlined above, this can be partly explained by, first, a preoccupation of the European Council with the European sovereign debt crisis, second, a lack of agenda-shaping impetus by the High Representative and third, a reluctance of EU Member States to actually use

⁷⁸ See Fiott, *supra* n. 40, at 58.

the Lisbon provisions for (military) crisis management, including the new form of flexible CSDP integration ‘Permanent Structured Cooperation’. But what is the underlying reason for the reluctance of the EU Member States to actually use the new CFSP provisions – and also for their traditional reluctance to establish them in the first place in the process of European integration?

Drawing on neo-realist approaches, we have argued that the changing structure of the international system and the interests of major powers have to be taken into account. Put in a long-term perspective, in matters of foreign and especially security policy, the Europeans have essentially relied on the NATO framework and on the United States as protecting superpower. During the Cold War and the period of bipolarity, as well as during the subsequent short period of unipolarity, this can be regarded as a rational and convenient choice for most (West) European states and the European Community / European Union as a whole. After all, the strong US involvement in international crisis management during the conflicts in the Western Balkans from 1991 onwards proved the continuous US engagement with regard to security crises in and next to Europe. With the emerging multipolar structure of the international system, illustrated by the rise of the BRIC(S) states in the past decade, this high level of US engagement in Europe is now put into question. The international reaction to the crisis in Libya in 2011 can be seen as a turning point in this regard: while the military operation was again carried out in the NATO framework (and a planned EU operation was never launched), the US insisted on playing only a minor role compared to the operations in the Western Balkans. At the same time, the then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton proclaimed a long-term shift of the strategic focus of the US to Asia (‘America’s Pacific Century’). Arguably, close political and economic ties between the US and the EU will not only persist, but might be even deepened as illustrated by the recent decision to revive negotiations on a transatlantic free trade area, i.e., an ‘economic NATO’.⁷⁹ However, in one way or the other, European states will have to adjust to the change of global power structures⁸⁰ – triggered also by Europe’s significant relative loss of international weight and credibility as a result of the eurozone crisis. On the internal side, the eurozone crisis has arguably tied up financial resources and accounted for a shift of the political focus away from external challenges.⁸¹ Thus, internal tensions in one

⁷⁹ D. Gabriel, *The U.S.-EU Free Trade Deal: Foundation for a New Global Economic Order*, Centre for Research on Globalization, 27 Feb. 2013), <http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-u-s-eu-free-trade-deal-foundation-for-a-new-global-economic-order/5324509> (accessed 20 Apr. 2013).

⁸⁰ See also S. Lehne, *The Big Three in EU Foreign Policy*, The Carnegie Papers 10 (Washington DC 2012), www.carnegieendowment.org.

⁸¹ In this context, a recent joint think tank publication urges EU decision-makers to opt for a more proactive approach towards various external challenges at the regional and global level. See The Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI), International Affairs Institute (IAI), Elcano Royal

EU policy field, namely the EMU, have produced negative spill-over effects with regard to the CFSP. Last but not least, given its extraordinary diplomatic and military resources, a possible exit of the United Kingdom from the EU, as it is currently discussed,⁸² would certainly shake the foundations of the CFSP.

Overall, taking into account both the CFSP reforms of the Lisbon Treaty, which are not fully exploited (internal factor) and the continuous de facto reliance on the US despite the implications of a multipolar world order (external factor), we do not see substantial progress of the CFSP but only incremental deepening and an inclination towards low level activities. There are innovations on paper waiting to be used – but if they will be used in the future is highly difficult to predict. In a pessimistic scenario, the reluctance of EU Member States to actually share CFSP resources and to use the already existing Lisbon provisions can even be interpreted as a decline of the CFSP. If the institutional basis has been created, one might argue, what else can be done to benefit from it? In contrast, in a more optimistic long-term scenario, the changes of the international system might encourage EU Member States over time to deepen the level of integration and to build on the slightly supranationalized CFSP framework as provided by the Lisbon Treaty.

Some of the political actors have indeed advocated a further deepening of the CFSP. Thus, the ‘Future of Europe Group’, composed of eleven EU foreign ministers, has recently proposed to strengthen the overall coherence of EU external action by concentrating the responsibilities for central external action areas – now dispersed among several Commissioners – under the hat of the High Representative. Moreover, they even cautiously proposed to ‘introduce [in the long term] more majority decisions in the CFSP sphere’.⁸³ In a similar vein, within academia, it has been argued that only the co-leadership of EU foreign policy actors – the High Representative and the EEAS together with the Member States, the European Commission and the European Parliament – will provide ‘new momentum for the common foreign policy project’.⁸⁴ However, in the light of the history of the European integration process and in comparison with other EU policy fields such as the EMU and AFSJ, we argue that a strong stimulation of the

Institute (RIE) & The Polish Institute of International Affairs, *Towards a European Global Strategy. Securing European Influence in a Changing World* (May 2013), available from the website of the European Global Strategy project: www.europeanglobalstrategy.eu.

⁸² David Cameron: *UK Could Drift Towards EU Exit*, BBC, 18 Jan. 2013, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-21076219> (accessed 20 Apr. 2013).

⁸³ Final Report of the Future of Europe Group of the Foreign Ministers of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Spain, 7 (17 Sep. 2012), <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/626338/publicationFile/171838/120918-Abschlussbericht-Zukunftsgruppe.pdf> (accessed 21 Apr. 2013).

⁸⁴ See Helwig, *supra* n. 3, at 235.

CFSP can mainly be expected from an increase of problem-solving pressure in terms of an external shock. In particular, an accelerated shift of the strategic focus of the US away from Europe and towards Asia and the related need to cope with future crises in the European neighbourhood on its own might lead to a full-fledged, effective and strongly 'brusselized', if not supranationalized, CFSP.

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